Multinationals and the Third World – Issues Related to Transfer Pricing by Wiss, Marcia A.
Third World Legal Studies
Volume 2 Article 4
1-4-1983
Multinationals and the Third World – Issues
Related to Transfer Pricing
Marcia A. Wiss
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/twls
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Third World Legal Studies by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at
scholar@valpo.edu.
Recommended Citation
Wiss, Marcia A. (1983) "Multinationals and the Third World – Issues Related to Transfer Pricing," Third World Legal Studies: Vol. 2,
Article 4.
Available at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/twls/vol2/iss1/4
-89-
Multinationals and the Third World -
Issues Related to Transfer Pricing
Marcia A. Wiss
A. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Transfer pricing is the transfer of anything of value between related
enterprises at a price other than that determined through arm's-length
negotiations. The affiliated or related enterprises within a
multinational enterprise ("MNE") typically use transfer pricing in the
sale of goods, data and services and the licensing of technology, patents
and trademarks among the members of the MNE. The prices charged to
related enterprises may reflect the free play of market forces. However,
since the MNE generally is in a position to adopt whatever pricing
principle it determines to be convenient to it as a group, prices for
such transactions may vary considerably from arm's-length prices, which
are the prices which would have been agreed upon by unrelated parties
engaged in the same or similar transactions in the open market ("arm's
length prices").
MNE's can be predicted to be more concerned normally with their total
net earnings after taxes, rather than with the form those earnings take
or the taxing authority which receives the higher percentage of those
taxes. Artificial arrangements between the various members of the MNE
can generate substantial benefits to it, without directly disadvantaging
corporations outside the MNE, since transactions with non-members would
be on an arm's length basis. However, some taxing jurisdictions are the
victims of transfer-pricing practices and others the beneficiaries.
Since national tax authorities need to determine the proper level of
taxable profits of affiliated enterprises operating within their
respective jurisdictions, the transfer pricing policies of MNEs are of
great importance to them, particularly where there are grounds to believe
that the taxable profits reported by a member of such a group are unduly
low. In such a case, the relevant national tax authority may have to
examine the possibility that this is due to the transfer-pricing policy
applied by the group.
It is generally acknowledged that, in taxing the profits of an
enterprise which engages in transactions with affiliated enterprises
outside the jurisdiction of the relevant taxing authority, the profits
should be calculated on the assumption that the prices charged in these
transactions are arm's length prices. The arm's-length approach has been
endorsed by the United Nations Group of Experts on Tax Treaties between
Developed and Developing Countries. It is the underlying assumption in
Article 9 of the OED Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and
Capital (1977). The Internal Revenue Code of the United States uses the
arm's-length concept to allocate income among related enterprises under
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code of the United States ("Section
482"). Modern bilateral double taxation conventions between many nations
have adopted the arm's length-principle.
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The MNE uses transfer pricing to achieve the following benefits:
1) To reduce total MNE tax liabilities by shifting
income to countries with low income taxes and
deductions to high tax jurisdictions;
2) To reduce customs taxes by decreasing the customs
value of an item;
3) To reduce profits in countries in which outside
shareholders, sometimes including worker
employees, own a substantial portion of the local
entity; and
4) To shift profit outside a developing country to
minimize the impact of restrictive foreign
exchange and currency controls or to remove
profits as soon as possible in the expectation
that expropriation might occur and terminate
profits.1
Although MNEs have reasons or incentives such as those mentioned
above for engaging in transfer pricing, it is not always possible for
them to do so. Often units of MNEs have considerable autonomy so that
they can, and often do, bargain with each other in a manner similar to
that of independent entities. For example, local management may want to
demonstrate a good profit record and therefore may resist central
management's directives to depress their profits artificially . In
addition, the tax considerations which are normally paramount reasons for
engaging in transfer pricing may be offset against other pressures from
minority shareholders or local governmental entities such as customs
authorities, exchange or price control offices. They may therefore
charge arm's-length prices, or even prices distorted in a manner
counterproductive to tax savings, in order to recognize alternative
benefits or to respond to alternative pressures. Therefore, it should
not always be assumed that prices among related entities are not
arm's-length prices.
In addition, it should be kept in mind that transactions within MNEs
may not be directly comparable with those which take place between
independent enterprises, so that allowances have to be made when
comparing transfer prices with the prices charged by independent
enterprises. For example, frequently a wide range of technical,
managerial and research and development support is provided to members of
an MNE in connection with the sale of goods, a phenomenon which is less
frequently found in the sale of goods to unrelated entities. Also, often
the production facilities of a related group are largely integrated with
divisions responsible for research and development, transportation,
marketing, advertising, design, and distribution. These functions are
rarely integrated when are performed by unrelated entities.
In addition to the interest of taxing authorities to assure that an
appropriate tax is paid to each, the MNE has a corresponding interest in
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avoiding double taxation. These corresponding interests in assuring that
a fair, non-duplicative tax is paid to the tax authorities facilitate
problem resolution through negotiation and resolution on a bilateral or
multilateral basis.
B. ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS
In determining an arm's-length price, three principal accounting
methods have been used: (1) the comparable uncontrolled or independent
price method; (2) the resale price method; and (3) the cost-plus
method. Under Section 482 these three methods are listed in this order
of priority in determining which would be the most appropriate allocation
of prices among related enterprises. The Report of the OECD Committee on
Fiscal Affairs (1979) favors use of the comparable uncontrolled price
method if possible; however, it recognizes that there may be cases where
the evidence of retail profit markups, production costs or other data may
be more complete, more conclusive and more easily obtained than an
undisputed evidence of open market prices and therefore one of the other
two methods would be preferable.
The comparable uncontrolled price, or independent price, method uses
the uncontrolled market price for the same or similar goods sold to
independent third parties. The resale price method takes the price at
which the goods are sold by the connected purchaser to its independent
customers and subtracts an assumed markup to arrive at the arm's-length
price for sale by the original vendor. The cost-plus method uses the
original vendor's cost and adds an appropriate markup to arrive at the
arm's-length price for the sale by the original vendor and thus for the
purchase by the reseller.
1. Comparable, Uncontrolled Price Method
The comparable uncontrolled price, or independent price, method can
be applied if a comparable uncontrolled sale, i.e., one in which neither
the buyer nor the seller are members of the same controlled group, can be
identified. Comparability exists if the physical property and
circumstances involved in the uncontrolled sales are identical to the
physical property and circumstances involved in the controlled sales. If
the differences have a definite and reasonable impact on the price, the
differences can be reflected by adjusting the price. Differences which
may affect the price of property include quality of the product, the time
and terms of the sale, associated intangible property, the size of the
market and the geographical market in which the sale takes place.
It is also possible to use the comparable uncontrolled price method
when viewing sales made by the MNE to unrelated customers and purchases
made by the MNE from unrelated sellers in addition to sales between
totally unrelated parties. Section 482 provides that this method can be
used if substantially the same products are sold under substantially the
same circumstances where differences either have no effect on prices or
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can be measured and eliminated with a "reasonable number of adjustments."
2. Resale Price Method
The resale method is designed principally for transfers to sales
subsidiaries that, without additional processing, sell the product to
unrelated customers. The arm's-length price is obtained by subtracting
an appropriate markup for profit from the uncontrolled selling price.
The markup is obtained by reference to similar transactions between
unrelated parties. The appropriate markup is equal to the gross profit
from uncontrolled sales of similar products or under similar
circumstances. In determining the appropriate markup, the similarity or
dissimilarity of resale must be considered with reference to: (1) the
product line involved; (2) the functions performed by the reseller with
respect to the property; (3) the effect on price of any intangible
property utilized by the seller, e.g., patents, trademarks, trade names;
and (4) the geographic market in which the functions are performed by
the reseller.
3. Cost-Plus Method
The cost-plus method is designed primarily for exports of components
or unfinished goods that will have substantial value added to them by the
purchasing subsidiaries. In determining an arm's-length price under the
cost-plus method, an appropriate markup for profit is added to the
seller's total cost of product. The resultations under Section 482
provide that the gross profit percentage is to be determined if possible
by reference to sales made by the seller to unrelated parties, or in the
absence of such sales, by reference to sales between unrelated parties
under comparable circumstances. The determination of the gross profit
percentage should take into account such matters as: (1) the type of
property involved; (2) the functions performed by the seller; (3) the
effect of any intangible property used by the seller in connection with
the property sold; and (4) the geographic market in which the functions
are performed by the seller.
C. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 482
To the best of my knowledge, the United States has exercised the
right of a taxing authority to reallocate prices charged between related
parties for a longer period of time than any other country and,
consequently has a large body of regulations, revenue rulings and cases
interpreting this right of the Internal Revenue Service to reallocate.
Therefore, frequent reference will be made in this paper to the United
States' policy and history with respect to transfer pricing in order to
shed light on appropriate systems that might be created by developing
countries in an attempt to combat transfer pricing. Both Germany and the
United Kingdom more recently have adopted procedures with respect to
transfer pricing that are similar to those of the United States.
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Obviously many developing countries lack the administrative and
enforcement mechanisms and trained personnel to implement a complex
tax-reallocation system. References to U.S. tax policy are, therefore,
provided as a guide only, to be adapted to local conditions as
appropriate.
Since the U.S. is frequently one taxing authority in intercompany
transactions, effective U.S. enforcement of §482 should minimize transfer
pricing problems for U.S. trading partners. The same should obtain as
other efficient taxing authorities adopt similar arm's-length rules.
Effective enforcement of these rules by the industrialized nations should
benefit Third World trading partners.
A recent study by Burns 2 illuminates the actual usage by the IRS
of the three accounting methods. Those U.S.-based MNEs responding to the
survey state that 80 of all exports to their subsidiaries were products
which were also sold to unrelated customers. Therefore, if circumstances
surrounding sales to related and unrelated customers were the same or
substantially the same, 85 of the transfer prices should or could have
been based on the comparable uncontrolled price method. The remaining
20 of all exports to subsidiaries were products which were not also sold
to unrelated customers. Approximately one third of these exports were
finished goods and two thirds were components or semi-finished goods.
Therefore, if an appropriate markup could be determined for those goods
sold only to subsidiaries, 7% of the transfer prices should have been
based on the resale method and 13% should have been based on the
cost-plus method.
Although 80% of exports to subsidiaries would seem to have qualified
for comparable uncontrolled price treatment, only 43% of the executives
surveyed believed that it was reasonable to use the comparable
uncontrolled price method for their firms' intercompany exports.
Although 7% of the exports to the subsidiaries would seem to qualify for
the resale price method, 35 of the executives polled thought this method
reasonable. The cost-plus method was shown to be overwhelmingly favored
by the MNE executives. Although only 13% of the exports to subsidiaries
would seem to qualify for the cost-plus method, 64% of the executives
consider this method to be reasonable.
The participants in this study reported that for intercompany exports
audited since 1965, the Internal Revenue Service calculated 24% of the
additional tax assessments by using a comparable uncontrolled price, 14%
by using a resale price, 30 by using the cost-plus price, and 32% by
using some other measure.
An earlier study by Duerr3 revealed this same lack of use of the
supposedly preferred comparable uncontrolled price method. In Duerr's
study, which examined IRS audits of intercompany sales, the respondents
stated that IRS reallocations during a ten-year period were based on the
comparable uncontrolled price method only 28% of the time, on the resale
method 13% of the time, on the cost-plus method 23% and on some other
procedure the remaining 36% of the time.
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Even the U.S. Treasury's own study4 revealed the same minimal use
of the comparable uncontrolled price method, which the statute declares
to be the preferred method. That study revealed that IRS agents
considered adjusting 591 U.S. tax returns for transfer pricing reasons
and actually adjusted 174, assessing $313 million in additional taxes.
Only 21% of the assessments were based on the comparable uncontrolled
price method; 11% were based on the resale price method; 27% on the
cost-plus price and another method was used 41% of the time.
This failure to use the comparable uncontrolled price method by the
IRS and the corresponding preference of the executives of MNEs that other
methods be used should be reviewed and considered by developing countries
when fixing priorities of accounting methods for combating transfer
pricing.
It should also be noted that respondents to the Burns survey reported
that 40 of all Section 482 assessments paid involved exports to
subsidiaries taxed at rates equal to or greater than United States tax
rates. Also, the Burns respondents reported that 52% had been subjected
to double taxation as a result of a Section 482 reallocation. This
occurred because the companies were unable to obtain a refund from
foreign governments to offset the increased taxable income established by
the U.S. audit. Respondents stated that refunds could not be obtained
because (1) the foreign government disagreed with the assessments
(57%); (2) the period set by the statute of limitations had elapsed
(42%); (3) there was no procedure for a refund claim (29%); and/or (4)
the procedure for a foreign claim was too costly (29%). Increased use of
reallocation audits by countries in which U.S.-taxed MNEs do business can
be predicted to further exacerbate this problem.
U.S. taxpayers might receive relief from double taxation resulting
from a Section 482 audit through application of the foreign tax credit
when the foreign subsidiary's profits are paid to the parent. Prior to
1965, the U.S. taxpayer was allowed to offset against the increased tax
liability caused by the Section 482 adjustment an amount by which foreign
taxes were overstated by reason of the improper treatment of such
transactions. In effect, a foreign tax credit was available without the
U.S. parent corporation having received a profit distribution from the
foreign subsidiary. Since 1965 a direct offset has not been allowed
against tax liability as a relief from the double taxation which
sometimes arises from a Section 482 audit. However, under Rev. Proc.
65-17, a tax-free repatriation procedure has been substituted. This
repatriation procedure is only available where the underlying
transactions giving rise to the Section 482 allocation did not have as
one of their principal purposes the avoidance of United States federal
income tax. The factors which the United States Government uses to
determine this are as follows:
1) The amount of dividends received from the
controlled entity;
2) Whether the taxpayer attempted in good faith to
comply with the Section 482 regulations then in
existence;
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3) The extent to which the rejected transfer pricing
arrangement contravened the regulations; and
4) The amount of any income tax levied by a foreign
country which resulted from the transaction.5
Several other aspects of Section 482 are worth noting. It gives the
U.S. Internal Revenue Service the authority, if necessary, to apportion
gross income, deductions, credits or allowances between related entities,
to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any such
businesses. Section 482 applies only to corporations owned or controlled
by the same interests and "control" includes any kind of direct or
indirect control. The reality of the control is decisive, not its form
or the mode of its exercise.6
Central to many of the problems under Section 482, and between MNEs
and taxing authorities generally, is that Section 482 is based on the
premise that a subsidiary can be constructively treated as if it were
economically separate from the parent. However, only 41% of the U.S.
respondents to Burns' study state that their organizations actually
operate this way. Although composed of legally separate entities, 49% of
the respondents stated that their companies make most of their
intercompany pricing decisions as though the MNE were one economic unit.
D. PROBLEM AREAS
Specific problem areas for proper allocation are treated by
regulations promulgated under Section 482 and by the Report of the OECD
Committee on Fiscal Affairs as follows: (1) loans or advances, 7
(2) performance of services,8 (3) use of tangible property and
leasing,9 (4) transfer or use of intangible propertylu and (5) sales
of tangible property.11
1. Loans or Advances
Since debt may be disguised as equity or vice versa, most
jurisdictions set forth tests to determine which transactions fall into
which category. This distinction is particularly important for the
country of the borrower, especially if a transaction is portrayed as a
loan, but is in fact equity. If this occurs, the country of the borrower
will ordinarily disallow the deduction of interest and will treat it as a
dividend payment, possibly attracting a different rate of withholding tax.
Countries have different approaches as to how to distinguish an
equity contribution from a loan. Some will only or principally look at
the debt equity ratio. However, since the debt equity ratio typically
varies significantly between industries, such variations have to be taken
into account. Other countries look at a number of additional factors,
such as whether there is an unconditional written promise to pay a fixed
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amount of principal at a fixed maturity date; whether the loan is
subordinated to the rights of other creditors; whether the debt is
convertible into stock or shares of the debtor company; whether the
shareholders of the company hold the alleged debt instruments pro rata in
relation to their shareholdings; whether the debtor is in default in the
event of a failure in the payment of interest; and whether or not parties
intended to create a debtor-creditor relationship.
One country adopts a flexible approach and generally looks at the
acts and circumstances of each individual case to determine whether the
transaction demonstrates "unusual financing." Loans are frequently given
to subsidiaries by parents during the start-up years, but most countries'
taxing authorities will not accept an interest-free transaction simply
because the enterprise is in a developmental phase.1 2 The rate of
interest occasionally also poses problems, although tax authorities
normally will require an adjustment only if the rate significantly
deviates from the market rate. Should allocation be necessary, factors
to be reviewed in determining a comparable or similar rate would be;
amounts and maturities; the nature or purpose of the loan (trade credit,
general purpose loan, real estate credit, etc.); the currency or
currencies involved (strong or weak currencies); the exchange risks of
the taxpayer lending or paying in a particular currency; the security
involved and the credit standing of the borrower.13
2. Services
Services in a group of associated enterprises are often performed in
a different manner and on a different cost basis than those performed for
unrelated enterprises. In highly integrated groups of enterprises,
normally services are performed which are different in quantity and form
from those provided between independent entities and therefore allocation
between members of the group may be difficult.
The general formula used by the OECD is that the enterprise receiving
the benefit should pay for the service.14 Therefore, if the parent is
providing services in which it is acting in its capacity as a
shareholder, the subsidiary should not be required to pay for such
services. In addition, expenses incurred by a parent company in
providing administrative services to subsidiaries, e.g., arranging
meetings of its own shareholders, consolidating the results of
performance of members of the group, or in providing financial assistance
to extend the scope of the group should not be chargeable to the members
of the group. However, when a real benefit has been conferred upon one
or more of the associated enterprises, a fee should properly be charged
by the parent.
In determining whether such a benefit has been conferred, it might
also be relevant to answer the question whether a member would have
bought the service had it been offered by an independent third party.
Examples of services in which a benefit is conferred might be detailed
planning services for particular operations, emergency management or
technical advice (troubleshooting), centralized accounting and legal
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services and even, in some cases, assistance in day-to-day management.
Since payment is often made by way of a flat rate fee, questions of
allocation must often be decided by taxing authorities. Again, reference
to outside transactions, with full recognition of the importance of
avoiding double taxation must be the guide. If the open market value of
services rendered is difficult to determine, it may be necessary to look
at prices charged by the parent for similar services to unrelated
companies. Normally all charged, direct and indirect, and a profit
should be included. The OECD suggests that if a comparable open market
price cannot be found and if the cost method does not seem appropriate,
other methods might be used by tax authorities, based, for example on the
examination of the overall performance of the relevant associated
enterprise.15 Of course, satisfactory documentary evidence must be
provided by the associated enterprise as evidence of costs incurred, time
expended, and services performed.
It is the view of the OECD that when countries levy withholding taxes
on service fees and contributions to central management costs, such
payments should not be taxed in the country of source unless they enter
into the computation of the profits of a permanent establishment in the
providing enterprise.16
3. Leasing and Use of Tangible Property
If property is leased for the full period of its projected economic
life, the transaction is essentially the same as a sale. Tax regulations
in the United States provide that when tangible property is leased by one
member of a controlled group to another member of that group without
charge, or at a charge which is not equal to an arm's-length rental
charge, the tax authorities may make an appropriate allocation to reflect
an arm's-length charge.17 Those regulations go on to define an arm's
length rental charge to be the amount of rent which would have been
charged for the use of the same or similar property during the time it
was in use in independent transactions with or between unrelated parties
under similar circumstances considering the period and location of use,
the owner's investment in the property, rent paid for the property,
expenses of maintaining the property, the type of property involved, its
condition, and all other relevant facts.18
The U.S. tax regulations provide different treatment for the leasing
of tangible property when the lessor is in the business of leasing. If
the lessor is in the trade or business of renting property, the
appropriate price is to be determined by reference to the usual price
structure.19
However, U.S. tax regulations provide that if neither the lessor nor
the lessee is engaged in the trade or business of renting property, then
the arm's-length charge shall consist of: (1) the amount of straight
line depreciation claimed by the lessor for U.S. tax purposes; (2) an
addition of 3% of the depreciable basis of that property; (3) all direct
and indirect expenses paid for accrued) by the owner of the property
during the year (including real estate and personal property taxes and
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maintenance and management expenses); and (4) the amount of expenses
directly and indirectly connected with the possession, use or occupancy
of the property by the user paid (or accrued) by the owner during the
taxable year. If the taxpayer wishes to establish a more appropriate
charge than the prescribed arm's-length standard which in essence
permits a safe haven, it is permitted to do so.2 6
4. Transfer or Use of Intangible Property
Transfers of intangible property between related enterprises present
particular problems of allocation. Under Section 482, intangible
property is defined to include:
1. Patents, inventions, formulas, processes, designs, patterns
and similar items;
2. Copyrights, literary, musical or artistic compositions, and
other similar items;
3. Trademarks, trade names, brand names, and other similar
items;
4. Franchises, licenses, contracts and other similar items; and
5. Methods, programs, systems, procedures, campaigns, surveys,
studies, forecasts, estimates, customer lists, technical
data, and other similar items.21
In applying an arm's-length standard to intangible property which is
transferred, the U.S. tax authorities first look to transactions
involving unrelated parties; however, if these cannot be found, recourse
is had to the following factors:
1) Prevailing rates in the same industry or for
similar property;
2) Offers and bids made by competitors;
3) The terms of the transfer, including geographical
limitations and the exclusive or non-exclusive
character of the rights transferred;
4) The uniqueness of the property and the period for
which it is likely to remain unique;
5) The degree and duration of protection afforded to
the property under the laws of the relevant
countries;
6) Prospective profits to be realized or costs to'be
saved through the use or the subsequent transfer
of the property; and
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7) Costs incurred in developing the property. 22
a. Research and Development
Industrial groups must devote considerable resources to research,
both basic and applied, and development to remain competitive. The
actual size of research and development budgets depends on a variety of
factors, including competition, corporate philosophy, anticipated profits
from the R & D activity and the general level of company profits. The
manner in which research and development expenditures are recovered
varies according to circumstances. Generally, these expenditures are
recouped only after intangible property such as patents or know-how is
developed. However, some MNEs have utilized cost contribution or cost
funding arrangements by which research and development expenses are
assessed among members regardless of the products.
The OECD Model Double Taxation Convention in Article 12 makes a
distinction between a know-how contract, under which one of the parties
agrees to impart to the other his special knowledge and experience which
is unknown to the public at large so that the receiver can use them for
his own account, as opposed to a contract for the provision of services,
in which one of the parties undertakes to use the customary skills of his
calling to execute work himself for the other party. For example, in the
United States a charge reflecting fair market value would be required for
transfers of intangible property, whereas only cost has to be charged for
the rendering of services generally. In several countries, a withholding
tax is not levied on payments of fees for services to non-residents;
however, it is for royalties paid for the use of intangible property.
Although in determining the amount of an arm's-length consideration for
the use of intangible property, the standard to be applied is the amount
that would have been paid by an unrelated party for the same intangible
property under the same circumstances, in many cases it will be difficult
to find a satisfactory comparable open market price since the owner of
intangible property, and particularly the owner of a patent, often will
not make it available to an unrelated enterprise. One common approach
employed by tax authorities to test the validity of licenses is to
appraise the trend of an enterprise's profits over a long period of time
in comparison with those of other unrelated enterprises engaged in the
same or similar activities which are operating in the same way. It is
generally not useful to employ the cost method since costs are amortized
over both successful and unsuccessful research.
b. Cost Contribution Arrangements
A phenomenon rarely seen in unrelated enterprises is a cost
contribution arrangement, whereby research and development costs are
financed by assessing unrelated enterprises at the time the R & D
expenditure is incurred, rather than at the time the patent or know-how
has been successfully developed. This is useful for financing
concurrently with expenditure and regardless of the success of the
research.
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A distinction may be made by tax authorities, when analyzing
cost-sharing methods since generally only net costs of R & D are
allocated to the participants of the cost-sharing arrangement.
Therefore, in some countries, such as the United States, no profit markup
need be added to receipts of the entity providing the research and
development.23 Correspondingly, double taxation principles would
indicate that an enterprise receiving the benefit of the research and
development would only be allowed to deduct the actual cost contributed
to the R & 0, without a profit markup to the provider. Since it is not
typical for a withholding tax on royalties to be levied against entities
that have concluded a cost-contribution arrangement, there is an
incentive for MNEs to use such arrangements.
MNEs using the cost sharing or cost funding method generally allocate
the aggregate costs of research and development on the basis of each
affiliate's proportion of worldwide customer sales. The United States
tax regulations provide that in order for the arrangement to qualify as a
"bona fide cost-sharing arrangement," it must reflect a good faith effort
by the participating members to bear their respective share of all costs
and risks of development on an arm's-length basis. 24
c. Patents and Trademarks
Determining an arm's-length price for patent rights is different from
doing so with respect to trademark or tradename rights. Patent rights
normally require a major expenditure prior to the time the patent is
received, whereas, a trademark generally costs very little prior to
receipt. However, it is generally costly to maintain a trademark or
tradename since the costs of advertising and quality control may be
significant. 25
Cooperation between the licensee and the licensor is a feature of
trademark licensing, since preserving standards and aiding in the
promotion of a trademark are important. Often complicated contracts such
as cross-licensing agreements or licensing pools may be used by
associated enterprises for trademarks and patents. Often "package deals"
are used by MNEs which include licensing of trademarks, tradenames,
patents, and other intangible property developed by various members of
the group, where responsibility for promotion and technical assistance on
the use of the intangible property is assured by other members of the
group. 2
6
The essential question in determining an arm's-length price for both
trademarks and patents is determining which party receives the benefit
transferred. The cost incurred by a licensee under a license agreement
for promotion and technical services fee will affect the amount of any
trademark royalty. In arriving at an arm's-length price, it may be
possible to use the comparable uncontrolled price method if a trademark
is licensed to unrelated enterprises; however, as with patent royalties,
generally there will not be significant licensing to unrelated
enterprises, and moreover, the value of a trademark in one market may
vary significantly from that in another. Generally, it will not be very
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helpful to refer to the costs of developing a trademark as a foundation
for determining proper allocation; however, the cost of maintaining the
value of a trademark may often be helpful.
E. STATE AND LOCAL EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES
Transfer pricing problems arise within the United States when state
and local jurisdictions try to collect taxes from MNEs. Lessons and
models from their experience can be used by developing countries with
similar problems.
In an effort to enforce an equitable taxation system, some states
have enacted the Multistate Tax Compact 27 which is designed to promote
uniformity and compatibility of the state tax systems as applied to
multistate-multinational businesses. This Compact, which has been held
valid by the Supreme Court of the United States28 contains uniform
legislation including the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
("UDITPA") which allows MNEs to elect UDITPA for allocation and
apportionment of income to prevent potential double taxation. The
Compact has a governing body of tax administrators from member states who
are empowered to promulgate uniform advisory regulations to conduct joint
audit programs and to carry on various administrative activities to
otherwise promote ease in compliance, bettern enforcement, uniformity and
compatibility in state tax systems as applied to MNEs.
An organization known as COST (Committee on State Taxation of the
Council of States Chambers of Commerce) which is composed of over 120
MNEs has been organized in the U.S. to combat the Multistate Tax Compact.
Five major issues have been identified by Corrigan, Schoettle and
Dexter which divide the states of the United States and the MNEs.29
The first is the income controversy. The MNEs take the position that the
manner in which they separately account for their income should be
controlling for tax purposes. However, it is the position of the states
that the income of the total unitary trade or business of the MNE should
be subject to taxation, whether carried out under a single corporate
umbrella or under many. The MNEs hold to the "separate-accounting"
approach by which the corporate form and organization which are chosen by
business management determine taxation. The states' "unitary" approach
stresses the economic or business substance of the activities which the
MNEs are pursuing.
The second issue is the "source" concept as applied to the income of
MNEs derived from investments in intangible properties, particularly
dividends and interest from subsidiaries and affiliates. MNEs typically
take the position that such income should be attributed to the state of
the receiving corporation's commercial domicile, where the corporate
headquarters are located. Typically this state is a tax haven. It is
the position of the states that income which is closely associated with,
arises out of, and is used in connection with the MNE's unitary business,
should be attributable to those jurisdictions or "sources" in which it
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carries on its underlying business activities. Under the UDITPA, income
is apportioned under a formula if it is "business" income. Utilizing the
separate corporate identity approach and a commercial domicile in a low
or zero taxation state, frequently MNEs in the United States are subject
to negligible state taxation. A large number of states in the United
States allow MNEs to escape state taxation through these two mechanisms.
The third issue concerns apportionment of income. Under the UDITPA,
business income is attributable to the source of a corporation's tangible
properties, payroll and sales. Frequently the apportionment formulas
used to attribute income to one state or another varies, and, therefore,
double taxation or undertaxation is predictable. Through use of the
Multistate Tax Commission, attempts are being made to achieve uniformity.
The fourth major issue is uniform enforcement because most states
have inadequate programs for in-depth, substantiated audits of complex
multinational businesses. The states have traditionally been forced to
rely upon the information provided by the MNEs. They lack adequate audit
staffs, properly trained lawyers and business analysts. Therefore,
inequitable tax treatment has resulted. This experience is especially
relevant to Third World lawmakers and public servants.
The fifth issue deals with United States federal intervention because
the MNE community believes that Congress should enact restrictive
legislation curtailing the taxing powers of the state and local
authorities. Although no legislation has, at the writing of this paper,
been enacted, hearings were held in 1980. Senator Mathias has introduced
s.655, which would prohibit the states from applying the unitary
accounting concept. It would also exempt certain classes of income from
state taxation altogether, such as dividend income and so-called "foreign
source" income and would arbitrarily assign other income to the
commercial domicile of the MNE. At the time of this writing, this
legislation has been delayed pending several Supreme Court decisions,
especially Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,30
mentioned below.
Several recent United States Supreme Court decisions have been
decided against the MNE's. In Mobil Oil Co. v. Commir of Taxes of
Vermont31 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment of the United States
Constitution did not preclude Vermont from including dividends from
overseas operations in apportionable income. In Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin
Dept. of Rev. 32 the Supreme Court dealt with the vertically integrated
petroleum and petroleum-related businesses of Exxon. The Supreme Court
disagreed with Exxon's assertion that only the income attributable to its
"separately-accounted-for" activities in Wisconsin could be apportioned
in part to Wisconsin. It had been Exxon's contention that since it
"separately-accounted-for" its marketing income apart from its
exploration and production and refining income, only its marketing income
could be subject to apportionment in Wisconsin under the due process
clause of the United States Constitution.
The question of unitary "combined reporting" was again before the
-103-
Supreme Court in Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co.;33 Woolworth Co. v. New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department3 4
and Asarco v. Idaho State Tax Commission.3 " In the latter two cases,
the MEs successfully challenged the unitary method as a violation of the
due process and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. In
Chicago Bridge & Iron 36 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, thereby
affirming the Illinois Supreme Court's decision upholding Illinois law
providing that taxes paid by foreign subsidiaries are not deductible on
Illinois State tax returns.
It is hardly surprising that several recent cases before the United
States Supreme Court concerning transfer pricing involve petroleum
companies, because transfer pricing has been used by petroleum companies
for quite some time. By the use of consolidated returns, sources of
profits and losses have been concealed. One of the techniques used by
petroleum companies to disguise profits has been the attribution of
profits or losses as desired to a tanker company that is shipping
petroleum.37
F. ENFORCEMENT
Due to lack of coordination among taxing jurisdictions, lack of
adequate information from the MNEs and frequent unavailability of
auditors, attorneys and others expert in analyzing profit and loss flows
from associated enterprises, enforcement of national or regional tax
codes is frequently difficult. In the United States, if a taxpayer does
not observe the Section 482 allocation rules, the Internal Revenue
Service will make an adjustment to its income on an arm's-length basis.
This will produce an income tax deficiency for the year under audit and
other more drastic results might occur. For example, the allocation may
result in the loss of DISC treatment or could cause a U.S. shareholder to
be taxed currently on income earned abroad under Subpart F of the
Internal Revenue Code. Allocations could also affect the foreign tax
credit or could result in the declaration that a corporation is a
personal holding company, which could have negative tax implications to
the U.S. corporations. Furthermore, a collateral consequence of a
Section 482 allocation might be the application of constructive dividend
treatment. 3 8
Obviously, each taxing jurisdiction can impose penalties on local
entities affiliated with MNEs when those entities fail to allocate income
and losses in a manner which the local jurisdiction deems acceptable.
Ideally, most taxing jurisdictions would also seek to minimize the double
taxation upon related entities within their jurisdiction. Frequently a
foreign tax credit will offset double taxation when a foreign
subsidiary's profits are paid to the parent. However, often those profit
distributions are not anticipated until the future. The United States
Treasury has developed a Model Income Tax Convention which covers, inter
alia, associated enterprises. (Attachment A). This provides for
appropriate adjustments to the tax of one associated enterprise when
already taxed by another taxing authority. This model U.S. Income Tax
-104-
Convention has been incorporated into many of the modern bilateral tax
treaties to which the United States is a party. It also provides for the
arm's-length standard to be observed in transactions between related
entities. Furthermore, there is provision for consultation between
"competent authorities" of the contracting states with respect to tax
issues for allocation of income and deductions. The 1977 Model United
States Income Tax Convention under Article 25 entitled "Mutual*Agreement
Procedure" sets forth the procedures which are followed under most of the
modern United States treaties against double taxation. (Attachment B).
G. CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MNES
Many in the Third World have challenged the size and power of MNEs
and have sought to set standards of conduct for their operations in
various fora. One of the suggestions has been the regulation of transfer
pricing. For example, the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations
has been working on a proposed code of conduct since its Second Session
in 1976. In 1967 the OECD proposed a code for the protection of foreign
private investment and in June 1976 it adopted a "Declaration,"
"Guidelines" and three "Decisions" for MNEs that establish a standard of
conduct which is "voluntary." In 1979 the OECD Council made specific
recommendations on the determination of transfer prices between
associated enterprises. (Attachment C). UNCTAD's Conference on an
International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology has not yet
concluded an agreed upon text as a result of a conflict over the
principles of "applicable law" to be invoked in settling disputes.
However, one of the issues which also remains to be resolved includes the
scope of the Code's application, particularly whether the Code should
apply to transactions between affiliated enterprises.3 9
The International Chamber of Commerce in 1972 adopted the "Guidelines
for International Investment," which were not designed to be a "rigid
code of conduct." They contain rules for investors, home countries and
host countries of investors.
H. CONCLUSION
The magnitude of the transfer pricing problem is significant. For
example, in the United States a special Department of Commerce survey
found that in 1970, 22.4% of all export sales of U.S. manufactured goods
and services were made to U.S. MNEs, subsidiaries and affiliates
abroad.40 A subsequent survey of twenty corporations, representing 5%
of U.S. industrial activities, showed that 29.5% of their manufactured
goods and services were export sales to their manufacturing subsidiaries
and affiliates abroad.41 Similar patterns exist for other
industrialized countries.
In order to reach fair and equitable allocation of taxes among taxing
jurisdictions, including both developing countries and developed
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countries, it is appropriate and helpful that further study,
understanding and negotiation of the problem of transfer pricing be
conducted within appropriate international fora and international
standards be adopted which have the consensus of the major participants
in the problem. Transfer pricing clearly is an issue which properly and
advantageously can be discussed and resolved in international fora at
which representatives of host countries, home countries and MNEs have
full participation.
Awareness of the nature of the problem faced by developing countries
in recognizing, reallocating and enforcing reallocation of transfer
prices is an important step towards resolution. This paper has attempted
to outline the nature of the problem; the motivations and limitations on
MNEs engaging in transfer pricing; the problem areas for developing
countries' taxing authorities in properly allocating transfer prices; the
experience and guidance of other taxing authorities such as the U.S. and
the individual states within the United States and the OECD's analysis of
the problem. Unilateral, bilateral and multilateral actions are called
for to achieve an orderly, equitable and enforceable system for treating
transfers among related enterprises. This paper has attempted to
illuminate some aspects of the issue, which will allow each of us more
fully to understand the problem so that we might most effectively seek a
solution.
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ATTACHMENT A
Treasury Department's Model Income Tax Property
Article 9
ASSOCIATED ENTERPRISES
1. Where
a) an enterprise of a Contracting State participates directly or
indirectly in the management, control or capital of an
enterprise of the other Contracting State, or
b) the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the
management, control or capital of an enterprise of a
Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting
State,
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two
enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which
differ from those which would be made between independent
enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those
Conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by
reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included
in the profits of that enterprise and taxed accordingly.
2. Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an
enterprise of that State, and taxes accordingly, profits on which
an enterprise of the other Contracting State has been charged to
tax in that other State, and the profits so included are profits
which would have accrued to the enterprise of the first mentioned
State if the conditions made between the two enterprises had been
those which would have been made between independent enterprises,
then that other State shall make an appropriate adjustment to the
amount of the tax charged therein on those profits. In
determining such adjustment, due regard shall be had to the other
provisions of this Convention and the competent authorities of
the Contracting States shall if necessary consult each other.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not limit any provisions of
the law of either Contracting State which permit the
distribution, apportionment or allocation of income, deductions,
credits or allowances between persons owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interests when necessary in
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the
income of any of such persons.
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ATTACHMENT B
Article 25 entitled, "Mutual Agreement Procedure" of the 1977 Model U.S.
Income Tax Convention provides:
1. Where a person considers that the actions of one or both of the
Contracting States result or will result for him or her in
taxation not in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention, he or she may irrespective of the remedies provided
by the domestic law of those States, present his or her case to
the competent authority of the Contracting State of which he or
she is a resident or national.
2. The competent authority shall endeavour, if the objection appears
to it to be justified and if it is not itself able to arrive at a
satisfactory solution, to resolve the case by mutual agreement
with the competent authority of the other Contracting State, with
a view to the avoidance of taxation which is not in accordance
with the Convention. Any agreement reached shall be implemented
notwithstanding any time limits in the domestic law of the
Contracting States.
3. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall
endeavour to resolve by mutual agreement any difficulties or
doubts arising as to the interpretation or application of the
Convention. In particular the competent authorities of the
Contracting States may agree:
(a) to the same attribution of income, deductions, credits, or
allowances of an enterprise of a Contracting State to its
permanent establishment situated in the other Contracting
State;
(b) to the same allocation of income, deductions, credits, or
allowances between persons, including a uniform position on
the application of the requirements of paragraph 8 of
Article 24 (non-discrimination);
(c) to the same characterization of particular items of income;
(d) to the same application of source rules with respect to
particular items of income; and
(e) to a common meaning of a term.
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ATTACHMENT C
Annex
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL
on the determination of transfer prices between
associated enterprises
(Adopted by the Council on 16th May, 1979)
The Council,
Having regard to Article 5(b) of the Convention on the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development of 14th December, 1960;
Having regard to the Declaration of 21st June, 1976 adopted by the
Governments of OECD Member Countries on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises and the Guidelines annexed thereto;
Having regard to the Report of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs of
12th March, 1979 on the determination of transfer prices between
associated enterprises;
Considering that transactions between associated enterprises (i.e.
between parent and subsidiary enterprises or enterprises under common
control) may take place under conditions differing from those taking
place between independent enterprises;
Considering that the prices charged in such transactions between
associated enterprises (usually referred to as transfer prices) should,
nevertheless, for tax purposes be in conformity with those which would be
charged between independent enterprises (usually referred to as arm's
length prices) as provided in Article 9(l) of the OECD Model Double
Taxation Convention on Income and on Capital;
Considering that problems with regard to transfer prices in
international transactions arise mostly between the various entities of
multinational enterprises and assume special importance in view of the
substantial volume of such transactions;
Having regard to the considerations in the Report referred to above
regarding the methods to be followed for the correct determination of
transfer prices for goods, technology, trademarks and services and of
interest rates on loans between associated enterprises;
Having regard to the need to achieve consistency in the approaches
of tax authorities, on the one hand, and of associated enterprises, on
the other hand, in the determination of transfer prices for-the purposes
of ensuring correct taxation of profits and avoidance of double taxation;
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I. RECOMMENDS to the Governments of Member countries:
1. that their tax administrations take into account, when
reviewing, and if necessary, adjusting transfer prices between
associated enterprises for the purposes of determining taxable
profits, the considerations and methods set out in the Report
referred to above for arriving at arm's length prices when
goods, technology, trademarks and, services are provided or
supplied or loans granted between associated enterprises;
2. that they give the Report referred to above publicity in their
country and have it translated, where appropriate, into their
national language(s);
3. that they develop further co-operation between their tax
administrations, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, in
matters pertaining to transfer pricing;
II. INSTRUCTS the Committee on Fiscal Affairs:
1. to pursue its work on issues pertinent to transfer pricing and
to the assessment of taxable profits of associated enterprises
in general;'
2. to report periodically to the Council on the results of its
work in these matters together with any relevant proposals for
improved international co-operation.
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